Global SOA requires a dynamic and ubiquitous security which cannot be provided by the SOA due to its static and pre-configured nature. Security is the major barrier for migrating SOA from intra-enterprise to the web. In this paper we are defining the security risk associated with the Global SOA and proposing the handler mechanism to prevent Denial of Service attack in a Global SOA environment. Our method emphasizes on the DoS attack on Web Services and suggests counter measures through the use of dynamic handlers.
INTRODUCTION
A Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) [1] is essentially a collection of services wherein the communication between services can involve either simple data passing or the co-ordination between various services to perform an activity. In the Global SOA [2] environment scenario, distributed systems are pervasive. These systems have the capability to remotely execute a file or a service on heterogeneous networks; Interoperability is the prime concern here which is responsible for the cross-platform communication. Web Services provide Web Service Description Language (WSDL) [3] , Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) and Universal Description Discovery and Integration (UDDI) that enable loose coupling of services [4] and also achieve interoperability. These three protocols viz. WSDL, SOAP, UDDI together make Web Services an appropriate technology for Service Oriented Architecture. In today's world, Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is used to make software, flexible to changes and interoperable. Also the software running on the industrial system has to ensure that a user aspiring for a Web Service should not wait unnecessarily long to get the service.
Currently SOA is being implemented at an intra-enterprise network. Now since SOAP message is using HTTP as transport layer protocol, we must use SOA over the Internet where service requestor and provider are part of different security domain over the web. The basic concern that prevents organizations to switch from SOA to Global SOA in a meaningful way is the lack of understanding of what the security risks are and the way to handle these security risks. The contribution of this paper is twofold: In the first place we classify the threats that Web Services are prone to and present a model to prevent those threats using handlers. In the second place, we propose the model to prevent DoS attacks using the concept of dynamic security handlers.
Denial of Service (DoS) attack is one of the most severe attacks that can take place on a Web Service. It prevents a legitimate user to access a Web Service. Out of various attacks on the Web Service DoS attack is the most difficult to trace and it gets detected only when the attack has actually taken place. We therefore emphasize on the handlers that have the capability to detect and prevent DoS attack at the first stage itself.
Our paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we explain the various threats that can affect the SOAP message while it participates in a multi-hop transaction over Internet. We also discuss the Denial of Service attack in detail. In Section 3, we explain the concept of handlers and present a model for Security in Global SOA using dynamic handlers. We also mention the reason why hard-coding is infeasible to meet the demands required in a Global SOA environment. Section 4 deals with the various advantages of our novel approach over existing methods to prevent DoS in Global SOA environment. Section 5 describes the concept of dynamic handler to overcome XML Denial of Service (XDoS) attacks. We present two handlers (XML Request Frequency and XML Size Check) to prevent the DoS attack. Section 6 concludes our paper.
SECURITY ISSUES IN SOAP BASED WEB SERVICES
Risks to the Web Services are similar to the risks that exist in web applications and component applications, like SQL Injection, buffer overflow etc. These risks arise from being distributed on a network. IT security controls like network firewalls and application firewalls have the ability to examine packets but cannot be a fool-proof solution for all kinds of attacks.
The data and documents that are exchanged among the service requesters and providers are vulnerable to attacks. A document may participate in a multi-hop transaction or can be subject to inspection by a variety of intermediaries, each operating in different security zones, including separate policy, security mechanism, geographic, technical, organizational domains etc. (Distributed systems risks). The message's payload may contain sensitive data. Some architecture may use plain XML over HTTP, and avoid using SOAP. This can lead to message spoofing, tampering, altering etc (Message risks). With these two high-level risk factors in mind, let's examine how threats and vulnerabilities arise in a Web Services system.
Service-level exposure threat & Message-level exposure threat
An attacker may footprint a system's data types and operations based on information stored in WSDL, since the WSDL may be published without a high degree of security. WSDL contains the message exchange pattern, types, values, methods, and parameters that are available to the service requester. An attacker may use this information to gain knowledge about the system and to craft attacks against the service directly and the system in general. Attacker may clone a WSDL File and create a forged web-service.
The XML request and response messages posted in SOAP may be passed without encryption; leaving the messages and any data they contain vulnerable to deliberate interception. Message exposure may lead to identity spoofing and replay attacks as explained in the Figure 1. 
Service-level illusion threat & Message-level illusion threat
An attacker may spoof the identity of the service requester by taking a wellformed SOAP XML request message and posting it to the service provider, causing the service provider to assume that the response is being sent to a valid service requester. Likewise, an attacker may spoof the identity of the service provider to deceive legitimate service requesters to post messages to the spoofed service provider.
XML messages are transmitted without integrity protection by default, leaving the messages vulnerable to tampering. An attacker may tamper with the XML message to execute code and/or gain privileges and information on service requesters and providers. Message tampering may result in injection attacks, using XML messages to transmit attack requests to other parts of the service infrastructure, as shown in Figure 2 .
Service-level intrusion threat & Message-level intrusion threat
An attacker may usurp command of a system through elevating privileges, for example on the service registry, which contains the policies for the services. The service requester and service provider publish service metadata in a service registry. The service metadata may contain:
• Service policy • Addressing and location • Quality of service • Interface information. The attacker may exploit the service registry to redirect service requests, change policy, and perform other privileged operations.
SOAP XML messages may be used to propagate viruses that contain malicious code to steal data, as illustrated in Figure 3 . XML messages may be used as a vector to transmit viruses that usurp command through shells or other
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Mitigating DoS Using Handlers for Global SOA Figure 1 . Example of exposure threats Figure 2 . Example of illusion threats mechanisms throughout the system. Injection attacks such as SQL Injection, LDAP Injection, XPath Injection, XML Rewriting Attack [5] and XQuery may be used to usurp privileges, drop and alter tables, edit user privileges, and alter schema information.
Figure 3. Example of intrusion threats

Denial of Service attack
A Denial of Service attack [6] (DoS attack) is an attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users. By targeting a computer and its network connection, or the computers and network of the sites user is trying to use, an attacker may be able to prevent user from accessing email, banking services etc., or other services that rely on the affected computer. One common method of attack involves saturating the target machine with external communications requests, such that it cannot respond to legitimate traffic, or responds so slowly as to be rendered effectively unavailable. The four basic types of DoS attacks on a Web Service are: Consumption of computational resources, such as bandwidth, disk space, or processor time. Disruption of state information, such as unsolicited resetting of TCP sessions. 1. Disruption of configuration information, such as routing information. 2. Obstructing the communication media between the intended users and the victim so that they can no longer communicate adequately. In a typical connection, the user sends a message asking the server to authenticate it. The server returns the authentication approval to the user. The user acknowledges this approval and then is allowed onto the server. In a Denial of Service attack, the user sends several authentication requests to the server, filling it up. All requests have false return addresses, so the server can't find the user when it tries to send the authentication approval. The server waits, for a specified interval, before closing the connection. When it does close the connection, the attacker sends a new batch of forged requests, and the process begins again-tying up the service indefinitely. The severity of a DoS attack can be very well be shown in Figures 4 and 5 . Figure 4 show the number of occurrences of DoS attacks based on the IP address & Figure 5 shows the typical flow of traffic during a DoS attack on a Web Service. [7] 
. DoS Flows per Minute
This above graph indicates the traffic flow during 14:53 -16:19 hrs on a server when a DoS attack had actually taken place. As we see in the figure that since the server was inundated with a large number of requests the traffic flow on the server was very high during the time 14:56. Now the server felt the pressure of DoS and consequently the server stopped responding. Thus there is a sharp decrease in the traffic flow from the server at around 15:00 hrs. Now after the server resumes operation there is a slight increase in the traffic flow as server is now able to respond to legitimate requests.
WHY HANDLERS?
SOAP allows for extensions in the form of headers but SOAP does not specify any headers by itself; instead it provides a framework for incorporating and processing headers. Each Web Service can define its own SOAP extensions using custom headers, however when the extension is to address a concern such as security, the extensions need to be standardized. WS-Security provides a standard for extending SOAP to address security concerns and provide the syntactic and the semantic support needed to implement any security model.
WS-security define a security header <wsse> to insert security claims and message level security but there are several issues that are not addressed by WS-Security such as:
1. What keys and algorithms can be used by the Web Services to encrypt or sign message data? 2. What if Web Services demand a certain quality of security? Consider a Scenario in which there are two Web Service W1 and W2. W1 need a special quality of security S1, and W2 needs a special quality of security S2. By the present approach we need to embed the mechanism to enforce S1 and S2 in the application code of the both the Web Services. Now if there are three Web Services W1, W2 and W3 and they require Special quality of security S1, S2 and S3 respectively then we again have to implement the mechanism to handle S1 and S2 in the application code of all the three Web Services.
In Global SOA architecture there are thousands of Web Services that interact with each other dynamically and they may require Special Security. So as Web Services grows larger in scale or becomes highly distributed, to manage a change in the security processing logic of each and every Web Service is enormous and will be practically difficult to make changes in application code. Moreover, the maintenance effort required will also be huge.
Therefore, we need a generic mechanism to deal with SOAP extensions. Our strategy would be to use Message Handlers also known as SOAP interceptors; they provide a way of modifying the SOAP Request/Response.
Handlers concept
Handlers will be configured on the both server side and client side engines .Handlers can be used for providing basic encrypting and decrypting of the data in the SOAP Message as well as dealing with complicated issues likes preventing Denial of Service attacks. A client application can use a handler to encrypt the data before it sends the SOAP message request to the Web Service. The Web Service receives the request and uses a handler to decrypt the data before it sends the data to the back-end component that implements the Web Service. Thus a client side security handler added a WS-Security element into the <wsse> header. The server side handler consumed the same header and thus can use it to enforce security making it independent of the business functionality.
Handler implementation
Handlers are created using the JAX-RPC handler APIs. We have created the handlers based on all the security risks describe in the section. All handlers are part of security package and can be bundled with J2EE or .NET Framework, or can be freely downloadable from Internet. Client will identify server side handlers based on this identification, and then create handler chain from the same package to implement desired security.
Handler chain
Handlers can be used for various security tasks. On the client side one handler may add a WS-Security header and another may encrypt the username and password in the WS-Security header. On the server side there will be a decryption handler followed by the authentication handler to verify the username and password provided by Client.
Our proposal is based on the Dynamic and Ubiquitous security in Global SOA and involves use of Dynamic Invocation Client (DII Client), as shown in Figure 6 . 
ADVANTAGES OVER EXISTING METHODS OF DOS PREVENTION
As compared to the PreSODoS method to prevent DoS attacks by Dr. Srinivas Padmanabhuni et al. [8] ; he proposes formation of a 'Patricia' tree. This forms a tree of an incoming SOAP message and compares it with a standard SOAP schema for that Web Service. If the Patricia tree formation of the incoming SOAP message matches with that of the standard Patricia tree formation of the standard message for that Web Service , the request is allowed or else blocked. This works well for the case of Intra-Enterprise SOA environment, but would not be helpful in case of Global SOA environment, as the generation of a tree takes a sufficient amount of time and resources.
Since in a Global SOA environment we require fast processing and execution, our novel approach is quite simplistic in nature with the added advantage of detecting the Denial of Service in the first stage itself.
In a paper titled "New Client Puzzle Outsourcing Techniques for DoS Resistance", Waters et al [9] , describe the use of cryptographic puzzles as a countermeasure to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Here the creation of puzzles is outsourced to a secure entity called bastion & its solutions are solved by a client to get access to a virtual channel .Verifying puzzles for correctness is an easy job for the server. Also the puzzles can be shared among the servers and the solution to the problem might be given to another server sharing the same puzzles.
Here the method though is appreciable but sharing of puzzles in Global SOA environment is difficult. Also another disadvantage is that a machine that has just joined the network will need to wait longer before it can have a valid solution.
SECURITY HANDLER FOR DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK
As per our proposed architecture we have developed the following setup to implement our architecture:
• The Web Services are generated using the IBM WSAD . • Flow analysis is performed by asking the network users to send the requests.
•
Handlers are created using JAX-RPC. Xml Denial of Service attack (XDoS):
1. By flooding Web Services with XML request thereby not allowing the service to process any other request. 2. By increasing the size of SOAP message
Method 1: XML Request Frequency ( Prevention of DoS from Flooding Web Services from Large number of Request )
To prevent the first type of XDoS attacks, we propose the following method:
Step1: The user credentials are checked and verified using the existing security handlers. Step2: The user is also authenticated and authorized using authentication and authorization handlers. Step3: A request is allowed to move to the next step, only after successful authorization and authentication. Every request header is stored in a database. Step4: Once the values are stored, the next step is to verify the frequency of the request. This job is done by DoS Handler as shown in Figure. 7 2. Second Handler (Filtering handler) will perform the filtering of SOAP messages in which all the SOAP message size will be compared with the maximum acceptable SOAP size for corresponding Web Services. 3. If the size of the SOAP message sent by the user is larger than the max acceptable size then that request will be blocked and user will be logged into the Threat Level Log. 4. If the same user again tries to send the large SOAP message that user will be logged into the Danger level Log and that user along with its IP address would be blocked. As shown in Figure 8 .
Figure8. Method 2 to prevent DoS attack
CONCLUSION
This paper presents how we can apply the concept of dynamic handlers to prevent Denial of Service attacks. Although a lot of research work is ongoing in this direction, but we highlight these methods, since they are relatively simpler to implement compare to other resource incentive method of preventing DoS. The main advantage of this method is that handlers are being invoked dynamically and real time data is being used for filtering traffic. Also since Denial of Service attack is being prevented in the first stage. Thus Web Service is protected from the attack and can provide services to its legitimate users.
Handlers also help to develop application without actually hard coding the security mechanism in it. This helps to create applications with high cohesion and low coupling and easier maintenance. Our approach overcomes the traditional method of using static data to prevent Denial of Service attack.
